Careers vanish after subprime 'free fall'
Kent and Mysti Cope were well-paid executives at subprime lenders who never thought the industry could disappear overnight. Now they're just trying to get by.
SAN CLEMENTE, Calif. (CNNMoney.com) -- Kent and Mysti Cope met and fell in love working for one of the nation's top subprime lenders. Now, their life has been turned upside down after the sudden implosion of the subprime mortgage industry.
Mysti was one of the last people out the door at New Century Financial, once the nation's No. 2 subprime lender. She had been in charge of e-commerce customer service with dozens of employees reporting to her. It was at New Century where the Copes met in 2000.
Kent worked for several of the firms that helped give birth to the industry, which specializes in making loans to people with less-than-perfect credit, in the 1990s. He has been out of work since August when he was laid off by Friedman, Billings, Ramsey Group (FBR) unit First NLC Financial Services.
"We're still both in shock that it could go from something so good to so bad so quick," said Kent, 59. "New Century in 60 days went from top of the heap to out of business."
The two didn't say exactly how much money they made at their last jobs but Kent admitted they each had six-figure incomes.
Today, they're trying to get by on his unemployment benefits of about $450 a week, which covers only about an eighth of the basic payments they owe every month.
Full article:
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/31/news/economy/copes/index.htm?postversion=2008033105
Monday, March 31, 2008
Thursday, March 20, 2008
The Truth, The Whole Truth, Nothing But The Truth
Long time, no posts - I guess that's what happens when the entity you are writing about no longer exists!
Reader "Mr. Miracle" pasted this article from the March 14 Washington Post while commenting on a previous post - thought I'd share it with you. No wonder FBR liked Daddy and Junior's way of doing business...
FBR's Awful Truth
By Steven Pearlstein
There was a time when lots of us were rooting for Friedman, Billings, Ramsey, the homegrown investment bank. With its strong bench of analysts, its focus on financial services and technology, its scrappy trading desk and a loyal network of institutional investors eager to buy up whatever it was selling, FBR was the Washington upstart determined to beat Wall Street at its own game.
But in the decade since it began selling its shares to the public, FBR seems to have careened from one disaster to another, losing billions of dollars for its customers and investors and constantly restructuring itself to give the illusion of reinvention. One of the founders was forced to resign from the firm after a federal investigation into whether the company had given inside information about one of its customers to another. Its own stock is so beaten down -- from a high $28 four years ago to yesterday's close of $1.93 -- that investors are pricing it at less than the company's book value.
Sad as it is to say, I'm coming to the conclusion that FBR has come to represent everything that's bad about Wall Street, quick to jump on every fad, substitute hype for solid research and earn big fees for peddling junk.
Let us recall, for example, that FBR was an active financier and cheerleader for the tech and telecom boom of the late '90s, putting its customers' money and prestige behind dozens of flameouts that included LifeMinders, WebMethods and Varsity Books.
In between bubbles, it took the lead in funding a Bermuda reinsurance company that entered the market just in time to get buried under two of the worst hurricanes in history.
FBR became an underwriter for the residential real estate bubble, helping to finance New Century Financial, Luminent Mortgage Capital, Thornburg Mortgage and American Home Mortgage.
In 2005, FBR decided to jump into the subprime pool with both feet, paying more than $100 million to acquire originator First NLC and losing hundreds of millions of dollars more before taking the firm into bankruptcy earlier this year.
A financial whiz I know compiled for me a list of all the stock offerings FBR underwrote between 2001 and 2007, both public IPOs as well as the private placements in which FBR specialized. He found that if you'd invested in all of them on the day they started trading, you'd be down now by about 20 percent. That compares with a gain of 20 percent on the Standard and Poor's 500-stock index, or a loss of 9 percent on the S&P Financial index.
Of course, investment banking is only part of FBR's business -- and at this point, the only profitable part, although even that is now questionable, given the market turmoil and the dramatic slowdown in new issues. But it's worth noting that in the past two years, when other financial firms were posting record profits from proprietary trading (buying and selling securities with the firm's own money) and asset management (collecting fees for running hedge funds and mutual funds), FBR managed to lose money in both areas.
Not that it would have been easy for an investor -- or a business journalist -- to come up with a clear picture of what was going on at FBR. No sooner would something go wrong than a press release would appear announcing some new strategy or structure or the shift of assets from one pocket to another. One day FBR is an investment bank, the next a tax-free real estate investment trust with a taxable investment bank subsidiary. Then, when the REIT starts to crash, it spins off the investment bank as a separate entity, selling part to a private-equity firm and then, a few months later, another part to the public. This is the kind of hocus-pocus that financial sharpies engage in when they can't succeed by delivering good value to customers and investors. With FBR, it's a case of being too clever by half.
What's most galling, however, is how well FBR's top executives have done for themselves despite all the misjudgments and setbacks. One founder, Russ Ramsey, was clever enough to cash out and leave shortly after the initial public offering. And before the recent troubles, Manny Friedman and Eric Billings made themselves two of the highest-paid executives in the region, with annual compensation packages approaching $10 million each.
But for pure chutzpah, nothing tops the recent announcement that, following a year in which the company posted an operating loss of $740 million, Billings and three other top executives were awarded bonuses and stock grants worth $30 million, at the time equal to nearly 9 percent of FBR's market value. The rationale given by FBR's compensation committee is a model of twisted logic that now infects the minds of corporate directors. It noted that these executives had gone years -- yes, two entire years! -- without a bonus because of the company's poor performance due to a subprime mortgage crisis that was outside their control. And it lauded them for their great success in selling off the subprime assets for which they grossly overpaid, and for raising $220 million through the IPO of the investment banking subsidiary to investors who, in the space of eight months, have seen the value of their shares fall by two-thirds.
One can only imagine what bonuses the FBR directors would have lavished on Billings and his associates if they had sold stock that had actually increased in value.
But equally absurd was the rationale for granting Billings $2 million and an additional 3.5 million shares of FBR stock as a retention award, so he won't go leave the company over the next three years. This is the founder of the firm with his name on the door, who, with 6 percent of the common stock, is already the firm's largest individual shareholder. By his own admission, he bet the firm on residential real estate and subprime mortgages -- and lost. So where else is he going to go? Does anyone really believe that recruiters from Goldman Sachs are banging on his door?
Of course, the better question is why, rather than picking the pockets of beleaguered shareholders to pay big retention bonuses, FBR's directors haven't sent Billings packing. After all, that's what happened at Citigroup, Merrill, Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns in the wake of similar misjudgments. At FBR, by contrast, not a single top executive has lost his job as a result of the mortgage debacle.
Reader "Mr. Miracle" pasted this article from the March 14 Washington Post while commenting on a previous post - thought I'd share it with you. No wonder FBR liked Daddy and Junior's way of doing business...
FBR's Awful Truth
By Steven Pearlstein
There was a time when lots of us were rooting for Friedman, Billings, Ramsey, the homegrown investment bank. With its strong bench of analysts, its focus on financial services and technology, its scrappy trading desk and a loyal network of institutional investors eager to buy up whatever it was selling, FBR was the Washington upstart determined to beat Wall Street at its own game.
But in the decade since it began selling its shares to the public, FBR seems to have careened from one disaster to another, losing billions of dollars for its customers and investors and constantly restructuring itself to give the illusion of reinvention. One of the founders was forced to resign from the firm after a federal investigation into whether the company had given inside information about one of its customers to another. Its own stock is so beaten down -- from a high $28 four years ago to yesterday's close of $1.93 -- that investors are pricing it at less than the company's book value.
Sad as it is to say, I'm coming to the conclusion that FBR has come to represent everything that's bad about Wall Street, quick to jump on every fad, substitute hype for solid research and earn big fees for peddling junk.
Let us recall, for example, that FBR was an active financier and cheerleader for the tech and telecom boom of the late '90s, putting its customers' money and prestige behind dozens of flameouts that included LifeMinders, WebMethods and Varsity Books.
In between bubbles, it took the lead in funding a Bermuda reinsurance company that entered the market just in time to get buried under two of the worst hurricanes in history.
FBR became an underwriter for the residential real estate bubble, helping to finance New Century Financial, Luminent Mortgage Capital, Thornburg Mortgage and American Home Mortgage.
In 2005, FBR decided to jump into the subprime pool with both feet, paying more than $100 million to acquire originator First NLC and losing hundreds of millions of dollars more before taking the firm into bankruptcy earlier this year.
A financial whiz I know compiled for me a list of all the stock offerings FBR underwrote between 2001 and 2007, both public IPOs as well as the private placements in which FBR specialized. He found that if you'd invested in all of them on the day they started trading, you'd be down now by about 20 percent. That compares with a gain of 20 percent on the Standard and Poor's 500-stock index, or a loss of 9 percent on the S&P Financial index.
Of course, investment banking is only part of FBR's business -- and at this point, the only profitable part, although even that is now questionable, given the market turmoil and the dramatic slowdown in new issues. But it's worth noting that in the past two years, when other financial firms were posting record profits from proprietary trading (buying and selling securities with the firm's own money) and asset management (collecting fees for running hedge funds and mutual funds), FBR managed to lose money in both areas.
Not that it would have been easy for an investor -- or a business journalist -- to come up with a clear picture of what was going on at FBR. No sooner would something go wrong than a press release would appear announcing some new strategy or structure or the shift of assets from one pocket to another. One day FBR is an investment bank, the next a tax-free real estate investment trust with a taxable investment bank subsidiary. Then, when the REIT starts to crash, it spins off the investment bank as a separate entity, selling part to a private-equity firm and then, a few months later, another part to the public. This is the kind of hocus-pocus that financial sharpies engage in when they can't succeed by delivering good value to customers and investors. With FBR, it's a case of being too clever by half.
What's most galling, however, is how well FBR's top executives have done for themselves despite all the misjudgments and setbacks. One founder, Russ Ramsey, was clever enough to cash out and leave shortly after the initial public offering. And before the recent troubles, Manny Friedman and Eric Billings made themselves two of the highest-paid executives in the region, with annual compensation packages approaching $10 million each.
But for pure chutzpah, nothing tops the recent announcement that, following a year in which the company posted an operating loss of $740 million, Billings and three other top executives were awarded bonuses and stock grants worth $30 million, at the time equal to nearly 9 percent of FBR's market value. The rationale given by FBR's compensation committee is a model of twisted logic that now infects the minds of corporate directors. It noted that these executives had gone years -- yes, two entire years! -- without a bonus because of the company's poor performance due to a subprime mortgage crisis that was outside their control. And it lauded them for their great success in selling off the subprime assets for which they grossly overpaid, and for raising $220 million through the IPO of the investment banking subsidiary to investors who, in the space of eight months, have seen the value of their shares fall by two-thirds.
One can only imagine what bonuses the FBR directors would have lavished on Billings and his associates if they had sold stock that had actually increased in value.
But equally absurd was the rationale for granting Billings $2 million and an additional 3.5 million shares of FBR stock as a retention award, so he won't go leave the company over the next three years. This is the founder of the firm with his name on the door, who, with 6 percent of the common stock, is already the firm's largest individual shareholder. By his own admission, he bet the firm on residential real estate and subprime mortgages -- and lost. So where else is he going to go? Does anyone really believe that recruiters from Goldman Sachs are banging on his door?
Of course, the better question is why, rather than picking the pockets of beleaguered shareholders to pay big retention bonuses, FBR's directors haven't sent Billings packing. After all, that's what happened at Citigroup, Merrill, Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns in the wake of similar misjudgments. At FBR, by contrast, not a single top executive has lost his job as a result of the mortgage debacle.
Labels:
bankruptcy,
doing what is required,
FBR,
First NLC
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